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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)
is responsible for adjudicating a wide range of subjects—only one of
which is international trade.1 Historically, trade cases have occupied
an extremely small portion of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.2 For
example, from October 2017 to September 2018, out of the 1530
Federal Circuit appeals docketed, just a little over four percent
concerned matters from the U.S. International Trade Commission
(“ITC” or “Commission”), the U.S. Court of International Trade
(“CIT”), or the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”).3 The impact
of these cases upon trade policy and the economy, however, is far more
immense. Indeed, the frequency and depth of discussion on trade
issues in 2018 was remarkable—from courtrooms to congressional
chambers, on television, and in tweets.
The 2018 term of the Federal Circuit included nineteen
precedential opinions involving international trade. Part I examines
those opinions addressing Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended (“Section 337”),4 with a focus on the strategic role that
remedies can play in achieving party goals. Part II explores a rare
safeguard case testing the scope of Presidential power to issue tariffs.
1. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
2. Statistics, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
the-court/statistics (last visited May 20, 2019) (providing statistics by source of appeal
from 1997 to 2018).
3. U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., YEAR-TO-DATE ACTIVITY AS OF DECEMBER
31, 2018 (Sept. 30, 2018), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/thecourt/statistics/YTD-Activity-December-2018.pdf (reflecting that sixty-seven traderelated matters were docketed at the Federal Circuit in 2018—twenty-one ITC, fortyfive CIT, and one DOC).
4. Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337).
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Part III summarizes those opinions addressing import classification,
which reflect a strong affirmance rate for the CIT. Part IV surveys those
opinions addressing antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duties
(“CVD”)—an area that saw considerable activity.
I. SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS
A. Overview of Section 337 Investigations
Investigations under Section 337 provide highly effective redress for
harm caused by imports created using unfair trade practices.5 Most
often the unfair trade practice at issue is a violation of U.S. intellectual
property (“IP”)—the majority of actions are patent-based.6 Other types
of claims that may be adjudicated using Section 337 include, but are
not limited to, antitrust, false advertising, passing off, and false
designation of origin.7 Because Section 337 has its roots in trade, there
are additional elements a complainant must prove beyond what is
required in a district court IP case—namely importation, domestic
industry, and public interest.8
Jurisdiction is in rem in Section 337 matters,9 and there are no
joinder constraints like those governing district courts.10 Accordingly,
a complainant may bring suit against dozens of respondents from all
over the globe in one litigation, in one court. Another hallmark of
Section 337 investigations is that they move quickly. The average
length of an overall investigation in the 2018 fiscal year was just over
eleven months, and even for an investigation completed on the merits,
the average length was only twenty-one months.11

5. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
6. Patent-based Section 337 investigations, by far, are the most common. See
Section 337 Statistics: Types of Unfair Acts Alleged in Active Investigations, FY 2006–FY 2015,
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/337_
statistics_types_unfair_acts_alleged_active.htm (last visited May 20, 2019).
7. See About Section 337, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/inte
llectual_property/about_section_337.htm (last visited May 20, 2019).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), (d).
9. See Sealed Air Corp. v. ITC, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“The Tariff Act
of 1930 (Act) and its predecessor, the Tariff Act of 1922, were intended to provide an
adequate remedy for domestic industries against unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts instigated by foreign concerns operating beyond the in personam
jurisdiction of domestic courts.”).
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 29.
11. Section 337 Statistics: Average Length of Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/337_statistics_average_length_investiga
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Section 337 also is known for its sweeping remedies, all of which take
the form of some type of injunctive relief, such as: (1) a limited
exclusion order (“LEO”) that prevents violative goods of the named
respondents from entering the U.S. market; (2) a cease and desist
order (“CDO”) that prevents violative goods already in the United
States from being advertised or sold by the named respondents;
and/or (3) a general exclusion order (“GEO”) that prevents violative
goods of both named respondents and unnamed violators from
entering the U.S. market.12 Although damages cannot be obtained via
Section 337, a complainant may file a parallel case in district court, so
as to achieve both injunctive relief and monetary compensation.13
Section 337 investigations are conducted by the ITC, formerly
known as the U.S. Tariff Commission.14 There are two layers of
adjudication. Six administrative law judges (“ALJ”), who handle
Section 337 matters exclusively, preside over the investigations
through discovery, hearing, and initial determination.15
The
bipartisan, six-member Commission then determines whether to
review those decisions.16 If the Commission grants a remedy in its final

tions.htm (last visited May 20, 2019).
“Overall investigations” include “all
investigations completed during the period, including terminations based on
settlements, consent orders, complaint withdrawals and merit-based final
determinations.” Id. In contrast, “merits investigations” are those “in which the
Commission rendered a final determination on the merits as to a violation.” Id.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (f).
13. See FAQs, INT’L TRADE COMM’N TRIAL LAWYERS ASS’N, http://www.itctla.org/
resources/faqs#section-337 (last visited May 20, 2019).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 2231(a).
15. Although a full ITC bench is comprised of six ALJs, in 2018 the ITC was forced
to operate with vacancies thereon. See Tiffany Hu, Ex-ITC Lawyer Returns to Agency as
Judge, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1019427/ex-itclawyer-returns-to-agency-as-judge (reporting that retired Judge Theodore R. Essex’s
“cases would be assigned to Chief Administrative Law Judge Charles Bullock until a
new judge arrived”); Tiffany Hu, ITC Judge Who Presided over IP Probes Retires, LAW360
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1080745/itc-judge-who-presidedover-ip-probes-retires (explaining that previous ITC press releases have stated that a
“‘full complement’ of judges overseeing [s]ection 337 is six,” but only five were listed
on the website at that time).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a); 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.43(d), 210.44, 210.45 (2018).
Commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate and serve nine-year terms. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a)–(b). During 2018, the
Commission was forced to operate with multiple vacancies thereon. Alex Lawson, ITC
Close to Full Strength as Ex-WilmerHale Atty Sworn in, LAW360 (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1029218/itc-close-to-full-strength-as-ex-wilmerhaleatty-sworn-in.
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determination, it is sent to the President,17 who has sixty days to
disapprove the Commission’s order.18 If the President does not
disapprove, the remedy takes effect.19 Notice for appellate review by the
Federal Circuit must be filed within sixty days of the determination
becoming final.20
B. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. ITC
With some notable exceptions,21 the overwhelming majority of
Section 337 appeals the Federal Circuit decides involve detailed, often
case-specific, patent-based disputes, rather than trade issues. Diebold
Nixdorf, Inc. v. ITC22 represents this common type of action. Because
the Author’s law firm represents a party in this matter, the Author
cannot provide commentary thereon and directs the reader to the
Federal Circuit opinion and other portions of the case record.
C. Converse, Inc. v. ITC
There is a great deal packed into the Converse, Inc. v. ITC23 decision,
which considered alleged infringement of common law and registered
trade dress owned by Converse covering the midsole of All Star shoes.24
Converse was a unique Section 337 Federal Circuit opinion in at least
two respects. Not only did it involve a type of IP not often the subject
of an underlying Section 337 investigation,25 it also was one of the
infrequent Section 337 Federal Circuit appeals addressing questions
that have a more direct bearing on international trade—in this case,
in the form of remedial issues.26
Converse claimed a Section 337 violation against thirty-two
respondents, resulting in twenty-three settlements or consent orders,
17. In 2005, the President delegated the authority to veto the Commission’s Section
337 remedies to the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”). Assignment of Certain
Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,251 (July 26, 2005).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j).
19. Id.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
21. See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
22. 899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
23. 909 F.3d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
24. Id. at 1113.
25. See supra note 6.
26. See, e.g., Converse, 909 F.3d at 1132–34 (O’Malley, J., concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part) (expressing concern with the court’s “failure to instruct the ITC to
enter a remedy against all the defaulting parties, or to justify its failure to do so by
reference to any relevant public interest concerns”).
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five defaults, and four active respondents.27 The ALJ found a Section
337 violation because the registered trademark was infringed and,
relying on the presumption of secondary meaning afforded to a
registered mark, was not invalid.28 As for the common law mark, the
ALJ determined Converse had not established secondary meaning
and, thus, was not protectable.29 The Commission reversed the ALJ’s
findings on validity of the registered mark but agreed with the ALJ that
the common law mark had not acquired secondary meaning.30 The
Commission and the ALJ both determined that, if the mark was not
invalid, it was infringed.31 With regard to the defaulting respondents,
the Commission refused to enter an exclusion order against them,
notwithstanding their default status.32
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ITC made a series
of errors requiring vacatur and remand. The court held that the “ITC
failed to differentiate between alleged infringers who started
infringing prior to Converse’s trademark registration and those that
infringed after the registration was granted.”33 The court explained
that, for any respondent that infringed prior to the registration of the
mark, Converse had to demonstrate, without the benefit of any
presumption, that the mark had acquired secondary meaning before
the respondent’s first infringing use.34 In so holding, the majority
altered the test for determining secondary meaning in multiple ways,
including, but not limited to, clarifying that the relevant prior use
period should be five years before the first infringement.35
Further, the court stressed that for any prior competitor use to be
relevant, it must involve a mark that is substantially similar to the one
asserted—a tenet the Commission failed to follow in its final
determination—and that this “substantially similar” analysis must be
applied to infringement as well.36 The majority also offered an assessment
of a survey submitted by the active respondents.37 The majority then
27. Id. at 1129–30.
28. Id. at 1114 (majority opinion).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1114–15.
31. Id. at 1115.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1118.
35. See id. at 1120–21 (citing Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012)).
36. Id. at 1122.
37. Id. at 1122–23. Further, the majority made clear it deemed unpersuasive the
arguments that labeling is always legally sufficient to avoid likelihood of confusion,
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instructed the ITC to consider whether the validity of the registered mark
should be addressed on remand, given that Converse sought a GEO.38
Judge O’Malley filed a separate opinion in which she dissented from
the majority in substantial part.39 In that opinion, Judge O’Malley first
stated that validity is an improper subject for remand because the ITC
has no authority to invalidate a trademark unless invalidity is specifically
asserted by a respondent as an affirmative defense.40 Moreover, she
pointed out that validity of the registered trademark is not relevant to
whether any remaining respondents infringed.41 With regard to the
defaulting respondents, they relinquished their opportunity to contest
validity by defaulting.42 With regard to the active respondents, the first
use of the trademark for each began before registration, making
validity of the registered mark irrelevant.43 “Thus, the only question
that could properly be before the ITC on remand is whether Converse
can show that its mark acquired distinctiveness as of each first use by
each” active respondent.44 The dissent maintained that “[t]he majority’s
attempt to expand the scope of appellate review by considering the
validity of the registered mark conflates the concepts of validity and
priority of use.”45 Accordingly, Judge O’Malley found evaluation of the
survey, which post-dates registration, to be unnecessary.46
Second, Judge O’Malley deemed the majority’s assessment of
infringement is improper. With regard to the defaulting respondents,
she asserted that they waived the right to challenge infringement, as
they did validity, due to their default status.47 With regard to the active
respondents, she clarified that, until priority of use is established,
infringement is not ripe for review.48 Moreover, according to Judge
O’Malley, the ALJ and the ITC made findings regarding infringement
to which deference is owed.49
that reputational harm is a prerequisite to an infringement finding, and that the
trademark was functional and thus not protectable. Id. at 1124.
38. Id. at 1118–19.
39. Id. at 1127–28 (O’Malley, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
40. Id. at 1128.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1128.
43. Id. at 1128–29.
44. Id. at 1131.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1131–32.
47. Id. at 1132.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Third, and most germane to international trade interests, Judge
O’Malley opined that the majority should have instructed the ITC to
issue remedial orders against the defaulting respondents.50 When a
party is found in default, Section 337(g)(1) requires the ITC to
presume the facts alleged in the complaint as true and to provide some
form of remedy upon request unless public interest would be harmed.51
This allowance was provided via the 1988 amendment to the statute for
very practical purposes.52 “Congress acknowledged that, without the
participation of a party in default, a complainant faced difficulties proving
facts sufficient to establish a violation of § 1337.”53 Consequently, Judge
O’Malley deemed the ITC without the power to deny Converse a remedy,
given the absence of any public interest concern in the record.
This issue regarding the degree of discretion the ITC has over what
type of remedy to issue against defaulters brings to the forefront an
important consideration that will affect the utility derived from and
effort needed for obtaining a GEO. To receive a GEO against
defaulting respondents, a complainant must show that “a violation is
established by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence,” per
Section 337(g)(2).54 In the majority’s view, there was an open question
as to whether that standard requires a review of validity when no party
has raised it as an affirmative defense.55 Because neither the ITC nor
the parties briefed the issue of “[w]hether the 1988 amendments, as
the dissent urges, require the entry of a general exclusion order
without addressing trademark validity or infringement,” the majority
instructed that this issue was best addressed on remand.56
There is, however, at least some indication the Federal Circuit would
find such review inappropriate in this matter when a more fulsome
record is presented. The majority noted “that even before 1988 [the
Federal Circuit] had held in the patent context that the ITC cannot
consider validity as to defaulting parties.”57 Although the majority
“d[id] not decide whether the same approach governs under the 1988
amendments with respect to general exclusion orders or in the

50. Id.
51. Id. at 1132–33 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(1) (2012)).
52. Id. at 1133.
53. Id.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2).
55. See Converse, 909 F.3d at 1118 (majority opinion); id. at 1129 & n.2 (O’Malley,
J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
56. Id. at 1119 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 1119 n.4 (citing Lannom Mfg. Co. v. ITC, 799 F.2d 1572, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
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trademark context,”58 the Lannom Manufacturing Co. v. ITC59 opinion
provides a rich history of why “Congress did not authorize the
Commission to redetermine patent validity when no defense of
invalidity has been raised”60 by private parties.61 It is noteworthy that,
similar to patents, registered trademarks also are afforded a
presumption of validity.62 Thus, it is arguable that, notwithstanding the
requirement to prove the need for a GEO through “substantial, reliable,
and probative evidence,”63 a review of validity still would not be
warranted, as no private party challenged validity in this case.64 Even if
this approach is adopted on remand, however, it is not a foregone
conclusion that a GEO will issue, as the ITC still has discretion under
Section 337(g)(2) whether to grant that heightened remedial measure.65
The adjudication of remedy is also complicated in this matter by the
fact that Converse, while maintaining its request for a GEO, pleaded
in the alternative for an LEO and, separate and apart from either flavor
of exclusion order, for CDOs.66 Although not addressed directly,
Converse generated a number of follow-on queries, such as: (1) whether
requesting an LEO as an alternative to a GEO is sufficient to satisfy the
“request” for relief required by Section 337(g)(1)(E); or (2) whether a
complainant must abandon its pursuit of a GEO against active
respondents in order to obtain an LEO against defaulting respondents.
The latitude the ITC has in awarding remedies against defaulting
respondents has a direct influence on the likelihood of success in such
situations. Because Section 337 often is used to obtain redress against entities
that are not expected to present a defense, this will be a case to watch.
D. Laerdal Medical Corp. v. ITC
Less than two months after the Federal Circuit issued the Converse
decision, it again considered the scope of the ITC’s authority

58. Id.
59. 799 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
60. Id. at 1580.
61. Id. at 1578–79.
62. Converse, 909 F.3d at 1117 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (2012)).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2)(B).
64. See Converse, 909 F.3d at 1128 (O’Malley, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-inpart) (“The ITC has no authority to invalidate a trademark—or patent for that matter—
except and to the extent that the validity of either is asserted as a defense . . . .”).
65. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2)(B) (noting that the ITC “may” issue a GEO against
defaulting respondents but is not required to do so).
66. Certain Footwear Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-936, Compl. at 221 (Oct. 14, 2014).
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regarding defaulter remedies in Laerdal Medical Corp. v. ITC.67 This
time, however, Judge O’Malley wrote for the majority. Laerdal Medical
also involved trade dress and trademark infringement (along with
patent- and copyright-based allegations) against eleven respondents,
each of which defaulted.68 The Commission non-reviewed the ALJ’s
default findings, and Laerdal Medical requested entry of an LEO and
CDOs.69 The Commission issued such orders based on Laerdal
Medical’s patent and trademark claims but issued no relief on its trade
dress or copyright claims, determining that even when the facts in the
complaint were presumed true, Laerdal Medical failed to show that any
respondent committed such infringement.70
As in the Converse dissent, Judge O’Malley relied on the “shall”
language in Section 337(g)(1) to “conclude that the statute, on its face,
unambiguously requires the Commission to grant relief against
defaulting respondents, subject only to public interest concerns, if all
prerequisites of § 1337(g)(1) are satisfied.”71 As described in the
opinion, although Section 337(d)(1) and (g)(2) contemplate a postinstitution review of the issues, Section 337(g)(1) does not.72 That the
ITC must find a violation of Section 337 before issuing a remedy does
not alter this interpretation.73 The opinion explained that, unlike in district
court, the ITC must determine pre-institution whether a complaint was
pleaded adequately, per Commission Rule 201.9(a), making it improper to
revisit the sufficiency of the claims post-institution.74
As in the Converse dissent, Laerdal Medical also reiterated that the
legislative history from the 1988 amendment to the statute, which
added subpart (g), supports this view.75 Prior to 1988, a Section 337

67. 910 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
68. Id. at 1210.
69. Id. at 1210–11.
70. Id. at 1211.
71. Id. at 1212; see Converse, Inc. v. ITC, 909 F.3d 1110, 1132–33 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(O’Malley, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (stating that the language of
19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(1) “requires the ITC . . . to provide some form of relief against
any parties found to be in default”).
72. Laerdal Med., 910 F.3d at 1213–14.
73. Id. at 1213.
74. Id. at 1213–14. Compare 19 C.F.R. § 210.9(a) (“The Commission shall examine
the complaint for sufficiency and compliance with the applicable sections of this
chapter.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2) (“The [district] court may conduct hearings
or make referrals” when needed “to enter or effectuate judgment . . . .”).
75. Laerdal Med., 910 F.3d at 1214; see Converse, 909 F.3d at 1132–33 (O’Malley, J.,
concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
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complainant had to offer the same proof of violation for defaulting
respondents as it did for active ones.76 The amendment recognized
that “discovery is usually difficult, if not impossible, to obtain from
named respondents who have chosen not to participate in an
investigation.”77 For all these reasons, the Federal Circuit reversed the
ITC’s determination that Laerdal Medical failed to plead its trade dress
claims sufficiently,78 vacated the ITC’s denial of relief, and remanded
the matter for the ITC to determine an appropriate remedy after
consideration of the statutory public interest factors.79
Although Laerdal Medical is based on several of the same arguments
contained in the Converse dissent relating to remedial relief available
vis-à-vis defaulting respondents, there is a key difference in the two
investigations—the type of injunction requested. Remarkably, in
Laerdal Medical, the complainant had originally asked that a GEO be
granted but then changed its remedial request to include only an LEO
and CDOs, avoiding the ambiguity faced in Converse.80 Thus, Section
337(g)(1), with its mandatory relief against defaulters, applied
unequivocally.81 In contrast, as discussed above, the complainant in
Converse maintained through appeal its request for a GEO,82 which
invokes consideration of Section 337(g)(2) and the discretion it allows
the ITC as to relief against defaulters.83
The broader lesson from both Converse and Laerdal Medical is that
Section 337 offers market-protecting injunctive relief against a
plethora of global entities unlikely to put on a defense. Although the
final decision in Converse may lend insight into the timing and types of
relief a complainant should seek, there is no doubt the ITC provides
complainants, in a single litigation, with far more opportunity to
obtain redress against defaulters than in district court.

76. Laerdal Med., 910 F.3d at 1214.
77. Id.
78. The copyright claims were not on appeal. Id. at 1211.
79. Id. at 1216.
80. Id. at 1210.
81. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(1) (2012).
82. See Converse, Inc. v. ITC, 909 F.3d 1110, 1118–19 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also supra
notes 36–38, 55–56, 66 and accompanying text.
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2).
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II. SECTION 201 SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATIONS
A. Overview of Section 201 Safeguard Investigations
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Section 201”) authorizes the
President to impose tariffs under certain conditions, instructing that:
If the [ITC] . . . determines under section 2252(b) of this title that
an article is being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat
thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article, the President, in accordance
with this part, shall take all appropriate and feasible action within
his power which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the
domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition
and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.84

In this context, a “positive adjustment to import competition” is
defined as “the ability of the industry to compete successfully with
imports after termination of the safeguard measure, or the industry’s
orderly transfer of resources to other productive pursuits; and the
ability of dislocated workers to transition productively.”85
Unlike Section 337 or AD/CVD matters, “Section 201 investigations
do not require a finding of an unfair trade practice.”86 Proving the
requisite injury under Section 201, however, “is considered to be more
difficult.”87 If a petitioner demonstrates that the imports in question are
a substantial cause (i.e., “important and not less than any other cause”)
of actual or threatened serious injury, the ITC will provide the President
and USTR with a report and remedy recommendations designed to
achieve import relief.88 After the ITC’s findings are submitted, USTR,
in consultation with other organizations (including the DOC), will make
its own recommendation to the President as to what, if any, relief is in

84. Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. II, ch. 1, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)); see 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (providing similar instructions and
noting reporting requirement).
85. CONG. RES. SERV., Safeguards: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/IF10786.pdf (last updated Dec. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Section 201
Safeguards]; see 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (defining “positive adjustment to import competition”).
86. Understanding Safeguard Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.
usitc.gov/press_room/us_safeguard.htm (last visited May 20, 2019) [hereinafter
Understanding Safeguard Investigations].
87. Id.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), (e); see Safeguards, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/tg_ian_002099.asp (last
visited May 20, 2019) [hereinafter Safeguards, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.].
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the national economic interest.89 The President must determine
whether to act within sixty days of receiving the ITC report.90 On the
day that determination is made, the President must transmit to Congress
in writing the bases for the President’s actions or inactions, including
the reasoning for any difference between the ITC’s recommendations
and the actions or inactions the President ultimately adopts.91
As the ITC describes the framework for Section 201:
Criteria for import relief under Section 201 are based on those in article
XIX of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], as
further defined in the WTO [World Trade Organization] Agreement
on Safeguards. Article XIX of the GATT is sometimes referred to as the
escape clause because it permits a country to “escape” temporarily from
its obligations under the GATT with respect to a particular product
when increased imports of that product are causing or are threatening
to cause serious injury to domestic producers.92

Notwithstanding this purported compliance, in May 2018, South
Korea requested WTO consultations with the United States regarding
the two U.S. safeguards recently promulgated on washing machines
and solar products and, a few months later, South Korea formally
requested that the WTO establish dispute settlement panels thereon.93
In August 2018, China also requested consultations with the United
States on the solar products safeguard.94
Section 201 cases are extremely rare. During the last forty-three
years (1975–2018), the ITC has handled only seventy-five such
investigations.95 Indeed, since 2001, there had not been a single
Section 201 action initiated until the recent efforts by the Trump
administration.96 This makes the following safeguard-related opinion,
which already is reflective of broader trade policy discourse that
occurred in 2018, even more intriguing.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Safeguards, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 88.
19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(4)(A).
19 U.S.C. § 2253(b).
Understanding Safeguard Investigations, supra note 86.
Section 201 Safeguards, supra note 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States
Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States97 involved the scope of Presidential
power in conjunction with issuing tariffs.98 Specifically, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s denial of a preliminary injunction to bar the
enforcement of tariffs on solar products imposed by President Trump
because movants could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits that the President exceeded his statutory authority.99 The origin
of the dispute began in May 2017 when a U.S. manufacturer of solar
products filed a petition with the ITC, seeking protective measures
against foreign imports for the crystalline silicon photovoltaic
The ITC undertook an
(“CSPV”) cell domestic industry.100
investigation “to determine whether an article is being imported into
the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported
article.”101 In November 2017, the ITC made affirmative findings that
such injury was taking place, but, because it could not garner the
required number of votes, it did not recommend a remedy.102
Pursuant to Section 302 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) Implementation Act,103 the ITC’s report
specifically addressed CSPV imports from Canada, determining that:
(1) Canada contributed approximately two percent of the solar
imports at issue during the applicable period; (2) the solar industry in
Canada was not among the top five suppliers of CSPV imports during
the relevant period; (3) Canada was the ninth largest source of solar
products; (4) imports from Canada declined during 2015–2016,
notwithstanding the increase in global imports; (5) three of four
sitting Commissioners determined that Canada did not contribute a
“substantial share” of solar imports; (6) Canada’s solar imports did not
“contribute importantly” to the serious injury; and (7) three of four
Commissioners determined that Canadian solar products should be
exempted from any safeguards.104
97. 892 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
98. Id. at 1342.
99. Id. at 1342, 1344–45, 1349.
100. Id. at 1342.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1342–43.
103. Pub. L. No. 103-182, tit. III, § 302, 107 Stat. 2057, 2100 (1993) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 3352).
104. Silfab Solar, 892 F.3d at 1343; see Understanding Safeguard Investigations, supra note 86.
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Under 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (known as the “escape clause”), once the
ITC determines that quantities of an import are a “substantial cause of
serious injury, or threat thereof,” to the corresponding domestic
industry, the President has the power to take “all appropriate and
feasible action within his power which the President determines will
facilitate efforts to make a positive adjustment to import competition
and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.”105 Such
safeguard measures also are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a), which
sets forth ten factors the President should consider when deciding
what measures to take.106
In January 2018, President Trump issued Proclamation No. 9693,
announcing a four-year safeguard that included a thirty percent tariff
on solar products.107 Although the Proclamation acknowledged the
ITC’s findings to the contrary, President Trump did not exclude CSPV
products from Canada because he found they “account[ed] for a
substantial share of total imports and contribute[d] importantly to the
serious injury or threat of serious injury found by the ITC.”108 The
safeguards went into effect on February 7, 2018.109 That same day,
Canadian manufacturers of solar panels and a U.S. importer of solar
cells (“Manufacturers”) sought a declaratory judgment that the
Proclamation was contrary to law, along with a corresponding
preliminary injunction.110 On March 5, 2018, the CIT, which had
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), denied
Manufacturers’ requests because plaintiffs were not likely to succeed
on the merits of the case, and public interest did not favor a
preliminary injunction.111 Manufacturers appealed.112
The Federal Circuit, exercising its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(1) and applying an abuse of discretion standard of review,
affirmed the CIT’s determination, emphasizing “relief is only rarely
available” for acts that purportedly extend beyond the President’s
statutory authority.113 Manufacturers presented several arguments they
claimed were likely to succeed. First, they asserted that the President

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Silfab Solar, 892 F.3d at 1342 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2012)).
Id. at 1344 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(2)).
Id. (citing Proclamation No. 9693, 83 Fed. Reg. 17, 3541 (Jan. 23, 2018)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1344–45.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345–46 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) (2012)).
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lacked authority to act because the ITC had not made any remedial
recommendations.114 The Federal Circuit held that the President’s
authority to issue the tariffs was in no way conditioned on the existence
of such a recommendation, but rather only on a determination of
serious injury, or the threat thereof, to a domestic industry.115
Second, Manufacturers claimed that the President only had
authority to act if the ITC complied with the statute, which, according
to Manufacturers, it could not have done without providing the
statutorily required recommendation.116 The Federal Circuit disagreed,
explaining that “[n]othing in [the statute] requires the President to
determine whether the Secretary or Commission committed any
procedural violations in making their recommendations, nor does [the
statute] prohibit the President from approving recommendations that
are procedurally flawed.”117
Third, Manufacturers argued that the President had not submitted
the requisite report to Congress regarding his actions and, thus, was
not in compliance with the statute.118 The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument because the record showed the President, in fact, had made
such a report and, in any event, explained that “the making of a report
is not a precondition for presidential action in this case.”119
Fourth, Manufacturers contended the President failed to consider
the ITC’s recommendation, as the statute requires.120 The Federal
Circuit also rejected this argument based on the record because the
Proclamation indicated such consideration occurred.121 The court
made clear that it has “no authority to determine whether the
President’s statement [wa]s factually accurate.”122
Finally, Manufacturers maintained the President’s Proclamation
violated the NAFTA Implementation Act, which requires the President
to determine whether a NAFTA country’s exports to the United States
“account for a substantial share of total imports,” and whether the
imports “contribute importantly to the serious injury” identified by the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1346–47.
Id. at 1347 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1347–48.
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ITC.123 Imports from a NAFTA country will be excluded only if the
President makes negative determinations on these points.124 The
Proclamation, however, included affirmative findings related
thereto.125 The Federal Circuit held that the ITC’s findings are in no
way binding on the President, and “[t]he President’s findings of fact
and the motivations for his action are not subject to review.”126 Indeed,
the opinion recognized that “courts have repeatedly confirmed that,
where the statute authorizes a Presidential ‘determination,’ the courts
have no authority to look behind that determination to see if it is
supported by the record.”127
III. CIT CLASSIFICATION CASES
A. Overview of CIT Classification Cases
When goods are imported into the United States, they are initially
classified under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTSUS”) by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).128 “The HTSUS scheme is
organized by headings, each of which has one or more subheadings;
the headings set forth general categories of merchandise, and the
subheadings provide a more particularized segregation of the goods
within each category.”129 The General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”)
and the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation are used to assess
HTSUS headings and subheadings when classifying imports.130 “The
GRIs are applied in numerical order and a court may only turn to
subsequent GRIs if the proper classification of the imported goods
cannot be accomplished by reference to a preceding GRI.”131

123. Id. at 1348 (referencing 19 U.S.C. § 3372 (2012)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1344.
126. Id. at 1349 (quoting Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
127. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (referencing non-reviewable presidential review of
Section 337 remedies).
128. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS), U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.usitc.gov/glossary/term/harmonized-tariff-schedule-united-states-hts
(last visited May 20, 2019); see 19 U.S.C. § 1484; Wilton Indus., Inc. v. United States,
741 F.3d 1263, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
129. Wilton Indus., 741 F.3d at 1266.
130. Id.; see Otter Prods., LLC v. United States, 834 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
131. Wilton Indus., 741 F.3d at 1266.
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An importer dissatisfied with CBP’s classification may file a protest with
CBP,132 and a denied protest may be challenged at the CIT.133 The CIT is
a nine-judge134 Article III court, located in New York, NY, but authorized
to sit in other locations, including in foreign countries.135 The subject
matter jurisdiction of the CIT covers a variety of international traderelated civil suits that concern imports into the United States.136 Most
litigation before the CIT pertains to AD/CVD duties, the classification
and valuation of imports, recovery of unpaid customs duties and civil
penalties, and other actions arising under tariff laws.137 Appeals from final
CIT decisions are heard by the Federal Circuit.138
Proper classification of products under the HTSUS is a two-step
process. First, “the meaning of specific terms in the tariff provisions”
must be ascertained.139 Second, it must be determined “whether the
subject merchandise comes within the description of those terms.”140
In the six precedential classification opinions decided by the Federal
Circuit in the 2018 term, each affirmed the CIT’s classification,
though, at times, using an alternative analysis.
B. Pleasure-Way Industries, Inc. v. United States
In Pleasure-Way Industries, Inc. v. United States,141 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the CIT’s determination that certain vans exported from the
United States to Canada, converted into motorhomes, and then
reimported could not be treated as repaired or altered goods re132. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (stating that “decisions of [CBP], including the legality
of all orders and findings entering into the same . . . shall be final and conclusive upon
all persons . . . unless a protest is filed”).
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012) (explaining that the CIT has exclusive
jurisdiction over any civil actions contesting the denial of a protest).
134. For 2018, the CIT was forced to operate with multiple vacancies on the bench.
Judicial Vacancies, AM. BAR ASS’N. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/
advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/independence_of_the_ju
diciary/judicial_vacancies.
135. About the Court, U.S. COURT OF INT’L TRADE, https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/
about-court (last visited May 20, 2019).
136. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1584.
137. U.S. Court of International Trade - Judicial Business 2017, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-court-international-trade-judicialbusiness-2017 (last visited May 20, 2019).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals of final decisions from the CIT).
139. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC v. United States, 769 F.3d 1102, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
140. Id.
141. 878 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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entered into the United States.142 CBP classified the motorhomes
under the facially applicable HTSUS subheading 8703.33.00.143
Pleasure-Way, however, argued that HTSUS subheading 9802.00.50
was more appropriate, which allows favorable treatment of imports
that meet the requirements set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 181.64—that is,
qualifying as “[g]oods re-entered after repair or alteration in Canada or
Mexico.”144 The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s summary judgment
that the regulation relied on by Pleasure-Way was inapplicable.145
In analyzing 19 C.F.R. § 181.64(a), the Federal Circuit explained
that the provision created two requirements for “[g]oods re-entered
after repair or alteration in Canada or Mexico”: (1) that the repair or
alteration not create “a new or commercially different good from” the
exported good; and (2) that the repair or alteration “not destroy the
essential characteristics of” the exported good.146 Subsection (b) of 19
C.F.R. § 181.64 specifically excludes from favorable import treatment
those goods that are “incomplete for their intended use” at the time of
export from the United States and “for which the processing operation
performed in Canada or Mexico constitutes an operation that is performed
as a matter of course in the preparation or manufacture of finished goods.”147
The CIT determined that: (1) Pleasure-Way created a new or
commercially different product from the exported vans; (2) PleasureWay destroyed the essential character of the exported vans; and (3) the
exported vans were incomplete for their intended use at the time of
export.148 The Federal Circuit, however, found it sufficient to address
only the first issue and agreed with the CIT that the converted
motorhomes were commercially different from the exported vans,
rendering them unqualified for special treatment under 19 C.F.R.
§ 181.64.149 In doing so, the court relied on evidence that the
motorhomes were given new names, sold for much higher prices than
the vans, and marketed as upscale leisure vehicles rather than cargo
haulers.150 That the motorhomes were still “identifiable” because they
retained the vehicle identification number from the vans was not

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1349, 1355.
Id. at 1349.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 181.64 (2017)).
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1350 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 181.64(a)).
Id. (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 181.64(b)).
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1352–55.
Id. at 1353.
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deemed compelling, according to the court, because “whether the
resulting good is ‘commercially’ different from the original . . . has very
little to do with whether it is possible to recognize the original
embedded in the altered good.”151
C. GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States
In GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States,152 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s remand determination regarding the classification of
imported screw fasteners.153 During 2008, GRK imported three types
of screws made with “corrosion-resistant, case-hardened steel” that
could “be used to penetrate” a variety of materials.154 CBP classified
the screws as “other wood screws” under HTSUS subheading
7318.12.00.155 GRK protested, arguing that the products should be
classified as “self-tapping screws” under HTSUS subheading
7318.14.10.156 CBP denied the protest, and GRK filed suit in the CIT.157
The CIT sided with GRK, determining that GRK’s screws did fall within
HTSUS subheading 7318.14.10.158 The Federal Circuit, however, vacated
the CIT’s judgment, holding that the CIT should have taken into account
the use of the screws when determining their classification.159
On remand, the CIT again determined that GRK’s products were
“self-tapping screws” under HTSUS subheading 7318.14.10, and,
again, the government appealed.160 The Federal Circuit agreed with
the CIT’s revised construction and declined to adopt the government’s
proposal for two reasons.161 First, the Federal Circuit opined that the
government’s construction ignored the eo nomine (i.e., “one that names
a specific product or describes by name the subject merchandise”)
nature of the terms at issue, instead defining them solely based on the
use of the screws.162 The CIT, according to the court, had given
appropriate consideration of use without making it the sole criterion

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1353–54.
885 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1342–43.
Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1343–46.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1347.

2019]

2018 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS

1445

and “abrogat[ing] the foundational tenet of tariff classification that eo
nomine provisions are distinct from use provisions and do not depend
on either principal or actual use of the imported merchandise.”163
Second, the Federal Circuit held that the record did not support the
government’s proposed constructions.164 Like the CIT, the Federal
Circuit looked to the World Customs Organization Harmonized
Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes (“ENs”),165
dictionaries, and industry standards to conclude that the common and
commercial meaning of “self-tapping screw” was not limited to only
non-fibrous materials.166
D. WWRD US, LLC v. United States
In WWRD US, LLC v. United States,167 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT’s determination that imported seasonal dinnerware and crystal
ware were not eligible for duty-free treatment because they were not
used in specific cultural ritual celebrations.168 Between 2009–2010,
WWRD imported decorative ceramic plates, ceramic mugs, ceramic
gravy boats, crystal punch bowls, crystal flutes, and crystal hurricane
lamps decorated with Thanksgiving and Christmas motifs.169 CBP
classified these items under the HTSUS based on their constituent
materials.170 WWRD protested these classifications, arguing that the
products were entitled to duty-free importation under HTSUS
subheading 9817.95.01 that covered “[u]tilitarian articles of a kind
used in the home in the performance of specific religious or cultural ritual
celebrations for religious or cultural holidays, or religious festive
occasions, such as Seder plates, blessing cups, menorahs[,] or kinaras.”171
CBP rejected WWRD’s protests, and WWRD filed suit in the CIT.172

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The World Customs Organization publishes Explanatory Notes to interpret
the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, the global system of
trade nomenclature on which the HTSUS is modeled. The ENs are not controlling,
but rather offer guidance on proper interpretation. Well Luck Co. v. United States,
887 F.3d 1106, 1111 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
166. GRK, 885 F.3d at 1347–50.
167. 886 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
168. Id. at 1233–35.
169. Id. at 1230.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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The CIT granted the government’s cross-motion for summary
judgment.173 Relying on the legislative history of HTSUS subheading
9817.95.01, the CIT explained that, before its creation in 2007,
utilitarian items used in ritual celebrations were covered by HTSUS
heading 9505, which allowed for duty-free importation of “[f]estive,
carnival, or other entertainment articles.”174 In 2007, chapter 95 was
amended to add Note 1(v), which removed tableware and other
specific utilitarian articles from its scope.175 Note 1(v), however,
referred to subheadings 9817.95.01 and 9817.95.05, allowing
exceptions for utilitarian articles used “in the performance of specific
religious or cultural ritual celebrations.”176 The CIT found that “rituals
generally encompass specific scripted acts or series of acts that are
customarily performed in an often formal or solemn manner.”177
Thanksgiving and Christmas, though cultural holidays involving
cultural dinner celebrations, lacked any specific formal or solemn act,
according to the CIT.178 The type of general purpose holiday tableware
at issue, the CIT stated, is not used in the same ritualistic manner as
the examples listed in HTSUS subheading 9817.95.01.179
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that “specific” modifies
“ritual” rather than “religious or cultural,” but emphasized that
“formality and/or solemnity, while relevant, are not required
characteristics of all specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations.”180
The court identified two requirements for a religious or cultural ritual:
(1) it “must have some prescribed acts or codes of behavior”; and (2) it
“must have some cultural or religious meaning.”181 Other nondispositive factors to consider include the formality or solemnity in
which the acts are performed, the degree to which such acts are
recognized, how established the organization is that is involved in the
ritual, and the purpose of the act in serving the organization or
representing the cultural/religious meaning.182

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 1230–31.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
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Although the Federal Circuit recognized that “WWRD present[ed]
a compelling argument that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners are
religious or cultural ritual celebrations,” they were not specific enough
to qualify under HTSUS subheading 9817.95.01, particularly when
juxtaposed to the exemplars provided.183 Moreover, the products at
issue were not “used . . . in the performance” of the ritual.184
According to the court, “the use must advance or serve a particular
purpose in the ritual,” which the imports in question do not do in the
same way as the exemplars (e.g., the Seder plates used to hold six
specific foods—each with a particular meaning or the blessing cup
used in specific Communion liturgy).185
E. Well Luck Co. v. United States
In Well Luck Co. v. United States,186 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT’s classification of imported sunflower seeds.187 Well Luck
imported three types of in-shell sunflower seeds—all meant for human
consumption and not for the “extraction of edible or industrial oils or
fats.”188 CBP classified Well Luck’s sunflower seeds under HTSUS
subheading 2008.19.90 as “[f]ruit, nuts and other edible parts of
plants, otherwise prepared or preserved, whether or not containing
added sugar or other sweetening matter or spirit, not elsewhere
specified or included: [n]uts, peanuts (ground-nuts) and other seeds,
whether or not mixed together: [o]ther, including mixtures: [o]ther.”189
Well Luck protested, arguing that the products were entitled to a dutyfree rate because the sunflower seeds were more accurately classified
under HTSUS subheading 1206.00.00 as “[s]unflower seeds, whether or
not broken.”190 CBP denied the protest, Well Luck filed suit in the CIT,
and the CIT agreed with CBP’s classification.191
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that, “by relying on the
‘narrower interpretation’ provided by the EN to determine that

183. Id. at 1233.
184. Id. at 1234.
185. Id. at 1233–34.
186. 887 F.3d 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
187. Id. at 1108–09.
188. Id. at 1109 (quoting Well Luck Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1368
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2017)).
189. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HTSUS subheading 2008.19.90).
190. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting HTSUS subheading 1206.00.00).
191. Id. at 1109–10.
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HTSUS [h]eading 1206 does not cover the subject merchandise,”192
the CIT failed to adhere to the instruction that a court should not
apply the limiting characteristics of any applicable ENs to narrow the
actual language of a heading classification.193 Thus, the court
concluded that the products at issue are prima facie classifiable under
HTSUS heading 1206, but this was not case dispositive, as goods can
be prima facie classifiable under multiple headings.194 Indeed, the
court also concluded that the products at issue are prima facie
classifiable under HTSUS heading 2008, as they are “seeds” and “fit to
be eaten,” and are “made ready for consumption or treat[ed] or
refrigerat[ed] . . . to prevent . . . decomposition or fermentation.”195
When there are multiple prima facie classifications, GRI 3(a) teaches
that the more descriptive heading is the preferred one.196 The Federal
Circuit instructed that the language of the headings, not the
subheadings, should guide the analysis, and to “look to the provision
with requirements that are more difficult to satisfy and that describe
the article with the greatest degree of accuracy and certainty.”197 In
this situation, the court held that HTSUS heading 2008 for prepared
or preserved foods was more specific and more difficult to satisfy than
HTSUS heading 1206 covering sunflower seeds generally and, thus,
affirmed that heading 2008 was the proper classification.198
F. Gerson Co. v. United States
In Gerson Co. v. United States,199 the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s
summary judgment of its classification for light-emitting diode
(“LED”) candles.200 In 2009, Gerson imported decorative LED
candles, which CBP classified under HTSUS subheading 9405.40.80
covering “[l]amps . . . not elsewhere specified or included.”201 Gerson
challenged this classification, arguing that its LED candles were more
accurately classified under HTSUS subheading 8543.70.70 covering

192. Id. at 1113 (quoting Well Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1373).
193. Id. (citing Sigma-Tau HealthScience, Inc. v. United States, 838 F.3d 1272, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
194. Id. at 1113–14 (citing GRI 3).
195. Id. at 1114–15 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
196. Id. at 1115 (citing GRI 3(a)).
197. Id. (quoting LeMans Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
198. Id. at 1115–16.
199. 898 F.3d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
200. Id. at 1233–34.
201. Id.
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“[e]lectrical machines and apparatus,” including “[e]lectric
luminescent lamps.”202 CBP denied Gerson’s protest, and Gerson filed
suit with the CIT.203 The CIT ruled that, although it was “plausible”
HTSUS heading 8543 might cover the LED candles, such a reading
would “impermissibly expand” that heading and “unduly narrow”
HTSUS heading 9405.204 It would also be discordant with the ENs,
which recognize chapter 94 as one for finished household lamps, like
Gerson’s candles, versus chapter 85 as one for unfinished lamps used
with other electric devices.205
In affirming the CIT’s ruling, the Federal Circuit first looked to the
language of the HTSUS headings at issue. HTSUS heading 9405
covers “[l]amps and lighting fittings including searchlights and
spotlights and parts thereof, not elsewhere specified or included,”206
whereas HTSUS heading 8543 covers “[e]lectrical machines and
apparatus, having individual functions, not specified or included
elsewhere in this chapter.”207 The Federal Circuit observed that the
latter heading made no mention of lamps, which both parties agreed
Gerson’s products were.208 The candles also did not appear to be
“machines or apparatus” encompassed in HTSUS heading 8543, as
they were primarily decorative rather than functional.209 The court’s
analysis of the context of HTSUS heading 8543 within the HTSUS as a
whole supports the interpretation that the appropriate classification is
under HTSUS heading 9405, as do the ENs. The Federal Circuit
explained that, if HTSUS heading 8543 were read to include the LED
candles, it would have to include “every electric lamp, because all such
lamps use electricity to generate light.”210 This interpretation,
according to the court, would nearly moot HTSUS heading 9405 by
reducing it to cover only non-electric lamps, which would include the
removal of electric searchlights and spotlights referenced specifically
in the heading.211 Such an interpretation also is in discord with the
202. Id. at 1234.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1234–35.
206. Id. at 1236 (alteration in original) (quoting HTSUS heading 9405).
207. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting HTSUS heading 8543).
208. Id.
209. See id. (noting that there was a “plausible” argument that the candles were
covered by HTSUS heading 8543, but ultimately finding they were decorative items
with a functional component and, therefore, outside the scope of the heading).
210. Id. at 1237.
211. Id.
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relevant ENs, which indicate that HTSUS heading 9405 references lamps
of any material using any light source, and “suggest that chapter 94 was
intended to include at least finished, standalone electric lamps used in
the home.”212 The ENs for HTSUS heading 8543, in contrast, describe
unfinished goods that are used as a component in other equipment.213
In focusing its analysis on the language of the headings, rather than
the subheadings, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that classification
takes a “top-down approach,” rejecting Gerson’s suggestion to look
first at the language of the subheadings.214 The court stated that to
adopt Gerson’s approach “would effectively divorce the analysis from
the necessary context provided by the higher-level headings” and,
contrary to precedent, would allow a subheading to expand the scope
of one heading and diminish the scope of another.215 Gerson argued
that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation had its own flaws—one of
which would be to moot subheading 8543.70.70 because no “electric
luminescent lamps” would ever fall within the “electrical machines or
apparatus” of HTSUS heading 8573.216 The Federal Circuit found this
argument unpersuasive, noting several examples within the relevant
EN of items that would fall within HTSUS subheading 8543.70.70 (e.g.,
“‘[e]lectro-luminscent devices, generally in strips, plates, or panels,
and based on electroluminescent substances . . . placed between two
layers of conductive material’).”217
G. Sigvaris, Inc. v. United States
In Sigvaris, Inc. v. United States,218 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
result (though not the analysis) of the CIT’s decision, denying duty
free classification for graduated compression hosiery as articles
specially designed for the handicapped.219 Between 2008–2010,
Sigvaris imported several entries of compression hosiery, classified by
CBP as “[o]ther graduated compression hosiery: . . . [o]f synthetic

212. Id.
213. Id. at 1237–38. The Federal Circuit also held that the CIT’s use of ENs to clarify
the scope of ambiguous headings was proper. Id. at 1238.
214. Id. at 1240.
215. Id. (citing Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir.
1998); R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1240–41 (quoting EN 85.43(16)).
218. 899 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
219. Id. at 1310.
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fibers” under HTSUS subheading 6115.10.40.220 Sigvaris protested,
seeking a “special classification” under HTSUS subheading 9817.00.96
reserved for “[a]rticles specially designed or adapted for the use or
benefit of the blind or other physically or mentally handicapped
persons; parts and accessories (except parts and accessories of braces
and artificial limb prosthetics) that are specially designed or adapted
for use in the foregoing articles.”221 After CBP denied the protest in
December 2011, Sigvaris paid the liquidated duties based off of CBP’s
classification and then filed suit in the CIT.222
The CIT granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment.223 As part of its analysis, the CIT determined that, although
the later, more severe stages of Chronic Venous Disorder could
constitute a physical handicap, the earlier stages could not, given that
early stage sufferers were still “ambulatory and able to perform daily
tasks.”224 The CIT then determined that the Sigvaris imports targeted
those with early Chronic Venous Disorder only and, thus were not
“specially designed for the [use or benefit of the] physically
handicapped.”225 Of significance to the CIT’s assessment was Sigvaris’s
own advertising, warning that the products are not for bedridden or
immobilized patients.226 Sigvaris appealed.
The Federal Circuit agreed “that the subject merchandise is not
specially designed for the use or benefit of any class of persons, let
alone physically handicapped persons,” but used a different analytical
framework than the CIT to arrive at this conclusion.227 The court
observed that “[t]he plain language of the heading focuses the inquiry
on the ‘persons’ for whose use and benefit the articles are ‘specially
designed,’ and not on any disorder that may incidentally afflict persons
who use the subject merchandise.”228 It also noted that the CIT

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 1310–11 (alterations in original) (quoting HTSUS subheading 6115.10.40).
Id. at 1311 (quoting HTSUS subheading 9817.00.96).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311–12.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1314.
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assumed improperly that the products at issue were “specially
designed.”229 They were not, according to the court.230
To be “specially designed” for purposes of this inquiry, the Federal
Circuit concluded that “the subject merchandise must be intended for
the use or benefit of a specific class of persons to an extent greater than
for the use or benefit of others.”231 Factors to aid in this assessment,
which were employed by CBP, include “the physical properties of the
merchandise, whether the merchandise is solely used by the
handicapped, the specific design of the merchandise, the likelihood
the merchandise is useful to the general public, and whether the
merchandise is sold in specialty stores.”232 After engaging in the proper
evaluation and relying heavily on Sigvaris’s own medical expert and
advertising, the court held that the Sigvaris compression hosiery was
not specially designed for a specific class of persons, and any incidental
benefits of said hosiery for those suffering from Chronic Venous
Disorder did not change this result.233 In light of the holding, the
panel did not address whether persons who might use the products at
issue are physically handicapped.234
IV. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
A. Overview of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
American industries may petition for relief from market distortions
caused by foreign producers that sell their goods in the United States
at less than fair market value, or by foreign producers whose goods are
subsidized by foreign governments to lower their costs.235 To obtain
such relief, a U.S. entity or group files an AD or CVD petition,
respectively.236 Before initiating an investigation based on either type
of petition, the DOC must confirm that the petition was filed on behalf

229. See id. (explaining that the CIT began its analysis by questioning whether
Chronic Venous Disorder constitutes a disability, which “presupposes that the subject
merchandise is ‘specially designed’”).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1314–15 (quoting Sigvaris, Inc. v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 3d. 1327,
1337 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017)).
233. Id. at 1315.
234. Id.
235. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2012).
236. Catherine DeFilippo, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, I-3 (June 2015), https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/handbook.pdf.
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of the appropriate domestic industry.237 A “domestic industry” in this
context requires two things. First, “the domestic producers or workers
who support the petition account for at least [twenty-five] percent of
the total production of the domestic like product.”238 Second “the
domestic producers or workers who support the petition account for
more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like product
produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for or
opposition to the petition.”239
The responsibility for evaluating AD/CVD petitions lies with the
DOC and the ITC. The DOC must determine whether there is, in fact,
unfair pricing and/or unfair subsidies.240 The ITC must determine
whether a domestic industry is being materially injured, or threatened
with material injury, due to such actions.241 If both the DOC and the
ITC make affirmative findings, then the DOC may issue AD/CVD
orders designed “to level the playing field for U.S. companies injured
by these unfair trade practices.”242 The DOC will establish an AD/CVD
rate for targeted respondents and an “all-others rate” for exporters not
individually investigated as well as for new exporters whose goods
prospectively will fall within the scope of the order.243
When questions arise as to whether a particular product falls within
the ambit of an AD/CVD order, an interested party may request a
scope ruling from the DOC.244 There is no specific statute governing
the scope interpretation for AD/CVD orders.245 The DOC has
addressed this dearth through specific regulations that complement
237. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1673a(c)(1)(A)(ii).
238. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(4)(A)(i), 1673a(c)(4)(A)(i).
239. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(4)(A)(ii), 1673a(c)(4)(A)(ii). “Domestic industry”
within the context of AD/CVD cases is a collective concept and very different from the
individual entity concept of “domestic industry” within the context of Section 337
investigations. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (referencing criteria for a single entity to
satisfy domestic industry through expenditures on U.S. plant and equipment, labor
and capital, and/or exploitation of the IP).
240. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(a)(1), 1673d(a)(1).
241. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(1), 1673d(b)(1).
242. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(2), 1673d(c)(2); Priority Trade Issue: Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/
trade/priority-issues/adcvd (last visited May 20, 2019).
243. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(1)(B)(i)(I), 1673d(c)(1)(B)(i)(II); see §§ 1677f-1(c)(2),
1677f-1(e)(2).
244. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a) (2018).
245. Meridian Prods., LLC v. United States, 851 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(citing Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co., v. United States, 776 F.3d 1351,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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case law.246 The DOC must always look first at the text of the order,
and, if it is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the language
governs.247 In evaluating the plain language, the DOC must consider
“[t]he descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the
initial investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary
(including prior scope determinations), and the Commission.”248 If
these sources do not lead to a dispositive result, the DOC may then
consider: “[(1)] [t]he physical characteristics of the product;
[(2)] [t]he expectations of the ultimate purchasers; [(3)] [t]he
ultimate use of the product; [(4)] [t]he channels of trade in which the
product is sold; and [(5)] [t]he manner in which the product is
advertised and displayed.”249 Scope rulings from the DOC may be
challenged at the CIT.250
B. Capella Sales & Services, Ltd. v. ITC
In Capella Sales & Services, Ltd. v. ITC,251 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s dismissal of two cases challenging CVD rates on aluminum
extrusions imported from China.252 In May 2011, the DOC issued a
CVD order covering such products that included an all-others rate of
374.15 percent.253 Between November 2011 and June 2012, Capella
imported four entries of the subject merchandise.254 Around the same
time period, other entities were contesting the 374.15 percent rate in
what became known as the MacLean-Fogg255 litigation, resulting in a
determination that the all-others rate was unlawful and establishing a
new rate of 7.37 percent.256 After the DOC issued its Timken notice
related thereto (effective December 10, 2012), it initiated, upon
request by multiple entities, an administrative review of 2011 and 2012

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1).
249. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).
250. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2012). For more information on the CIT, see supra Section III.A.
251. 878 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
252. Id. at 1330–31.
253. Id. at 1332.
254. Id.
255. MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2012), rev’d 753 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
256. Capella, 878 F.3d at 1332.
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entries subject to the relevant CVD order.257 Capella did not
participate, but when CBP subjected Capella’s entries to the 374.15
percent rate pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c), Capella refused to pay
and filed a complaint in the CIT disputing CBP’s imposition of the
higher duty rate.258
The CIT dismissed Capella’s case for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).259 It determined that 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1) and 1516a(e) clearly state that the original duty
rate would apply for entries made before issuance of a Timken notice
where liquidation was not enjoined by a court or was the subject of
administrative review—the situation presented to the CIT.260 Capella’s
entries occurred prior to the Timken notice, and Capella had neither
filed suit nor sought administrative review for its entries. Thus, the
original duty rate was appropriate.261 Capella appealed the dismissals.
In affirming the CIT, the Federal Circuit held that 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(c)(1), in particular its use of the term “entries,” was not
ambiguous and applied to Capella.262 It was undisputed that Capella’s
entries were made before the Timken notice in December 2012 and
were not enjoined by the CIT in a § 1516a suit.263 Capella’s claims to
the contrary were unpersuasive to the court. First, Capella argued that
“entries” in § 1516a(c)(1) was ambiguous because it was not modified
by “all.”264 As the panel observed, Capella offered no case law to support
this interpretation—and for good reason, as this would have meant that
Congress intended § 1516a(c)(1) to apply only on occasion.265
Second, Capella argued that the legislative history and the purpose
of the statute rendered “entries” ambiguous.266 The court disagreed
and identified examples from the statute itself demonstrating that
Congress understood how to except certain types of entries from the
rate calculated by CBP, as it did for entries made subsequent to a

257. Id. at 1331–32. The term “Timken notice” refers to the Federal Register notice
required by Timken Co. v. United States for decisions “not in harmony with” an existing
DOC determination. See 893 F.2d 337, 341 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
258. Capella, 878 F.3d at 1332.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1332–33.
262. Id. at 1333.
263. Id. at 1334.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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Timken notice.267 Moreover, the discussion of “usual” liquidation
situations in the legislative history only contrasted the “extraordinary
circumstances” already outlined in the statute (e.g., the § 1516a(c)(2)
suspension of liquidation during litigation), nothing more.268 Because
it was clear Congress “knew how to create exceptions” to CVD
assessments and “explicitly did so” when it desired, the Federal Circuit
“decline[d] to create further non-statutory exceptions based on the
extrinsic factors cited by Capella.”269 Accordingly, the court concluded
that “an ordinary reading of the statute indicates that only in certain
specified cases may [the DOC] apply a rate different from its final
determination rate. Interpreting the statute consistently with the
legislative history does not permit, much less require, [the Federal
Circuit] to devise a non-statutory exception to § 1516a(c)(1).”270
Even if “entries” could be deemed ambiguous, the Federal Circuit
indicated that, exercising Chevron271 deference, it agreed that the
DOC’s interpretation of § 1516a(c)(1) was within the range of
permissible construction.272 The court found that the DOC “sensibly
assesses CVDs on nonreviewed entries in accordance with the final
determination in effect at the time of entry.”273 The court recognized
that “[t]his is consistent with the limited time CBP has to liquidate
entries, . . . provides certainty to both [the DOC] and affected parties
of the applicable rate for non-reviewed entries, and encourages
affected parties to exercise the statutory avenues for challenging [the
DOC’s] determined rate.”274
C. Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. ITC
In Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. ITC,275 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the imposition of AD/CVD orders concerning CSPV cells and
modules from China.276 In 2011, SolarWorld Americas, Inc. filed a
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1335.
269. Id. at 1334–35.
270. Id. at 1335.
271. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(setting forth test to determine whether a governmental agency’s interpretation of a statute
warrants deference, whereby a court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by . . . an agency”).
272. Capella, 878 F.3d at 1335 (referencing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 & n.9).
273. Id.
274. Id. (citation omitted).
275. 879 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
276. Id. at 1379–80.
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petition seeking such orders.277 In 2012, the DOC determined that
CSPV products from China were being sold in the United States at less
than fair value and were being subsidized by the Chinese
government.278 In tandem, the ITC found that those same imports
were materially injuring a domestic industry.279 Chinese producers and
U.S. importers of CSPV products, including Changzhou, challenged
the ITC’s conclusions, filing suit in the CIT and arguing “that the
Commission had not properly found the required causal connection
between the unfairly priced or subsidized imports and the weakened
state of the domestic industry that it identified as ‘materially injured by
reason of’ the imports.”280 The CIT rejected this argument and
determined that the ITC’s analysis was properly supported.281 The
Chinese producers and U.S. importers appealed.282
In order to determine whether a domestic industry was “materially
injured” by the CSPV imports from China, the Federal Circuit
employed a two-part test: (1) whether “present material injury” exists;
and (2) whether that injury is “by reason of” the imports in question.283
The court also noted there were certain statutorily delineated
economic factors that must be considered, including the volume of
imports at issue, the effect of those imports on U.S. prices for like
domestic products, and the impact of those imports on U.S.
production operations of domestic producers of like products.284 The
opinion carefully laid out precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit, and other appellate bodies, along with relevant
legislative history, teaching that the statutory phrase “by reason of”
should be interpreted as requiring, at a minimum, but-for causation.285
How that standard is best applied, the court explained, may be factdependent, and the ITC is given broad discretion regarding the
methodology it exercises.286 “[T]he Commission need not isolate the

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1381–83.
Id. at 1383.
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injury caused by other factors from injury caused by unfair imports, nor
demonstrate the subject imports are the ‘principle’ cause of injury.”287
The Federal Circuit held that, contrary to appellants’ arguments, the
ITC properly addressed but-for causation—that is, the ITC determined
“that there is a causal nexus between subject imports and the poor
conditions of the domestic industry[,] and that the domestic industry
is materially injured by reason of subject imports.”288 More specifically,
the court recognized the comprehensive assessment made by the ITC,
as set forth below:
[T]he picture emerges of a domestic industry (1) with a steadily
declining market share despite phenomenal demand growth,
(2) that has lost market share due primarily to the significant and
increasing volume of subject imports from China, (3) that has faced
significant underselling by subject imports from China and
depressed and suppressed prices, (4) that consistently lost money
throughout the POI [period of investigation] despite the
tremendous demand growth and significant cost reductions, (5) that
by the end of the POI experienced declines even in many of the
performance indicators that previously had shown some
improvement, and (6) that reported recognizing asset write-offs
and/or costs related to the closure of production facilities, revalued
inventories, and/or asset impairments.289

Notwithstanding these findings, appellants argued that the ITC
failed to adequately consider other factors as causes for the challenges
faced by the domestic industry, such as competition from cheap
natural gas, the decline in government subsidies for solar energy
products (making it more difficult to sell those products at low prices),
and the increase in demand from the utility segment of the market, as
compared to other segments.290 With the definition of “material
injury” in mind (i.e., “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial,
or unimportant”), these factors, appellants maintained, materially
injured the domestic industry, even in the absence of Chinese
imports.291 The court, however, rejected each of these arguments. It
found that “the impetus toward grid parity” could not fully account for
the underselling of the CSPV imports.292 It further found that there

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1385.
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remained available a mix of favorable and demand-stimulating
subsidies during the POI.293 Finally, it found that, although the U.S.
utilities market was experiencing high demand, that phenomenon still
did not explain the declining share of the CSPV domestic industry in
the residential and non-residential markets, caused by “consistent and
substantial underselling” of the import products at issue.294
The Federal Circuit observed that:
[The ITC’s summary] rested on detailed findings about demand
conditions and the business cycle in the domestic market, the roles
of conventional and renewable sources of electricity, government
incentives and regulations at federal, state, and local levels, domestic
consumption trends, market segments, who was supplying the
domestic market, what happened to prices and market shares during
the POI, and the ways in which “the domestic industry’s financial
performance was very poor and deteriorating.” The findings rested
on various types of evidence, including the answers to questionnaires
addressed to market participants such as purchasers.295

In deciding that each of the factors identified by appellants “did not
account for (materially) all of the domestic industry’s weakening
during the POI,” the court held that the ITC “in substance made the
required determination of but-for causation.”296
D. Glycine & More, Inc. v. United States
Glycine & More, Inc. v. United States297 explored the degree of judicial
deference that should be afforded to government agencies. The
specific question the Federal Circuit had to address was whether “an
agency regulation, previously adopted by formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures pursuant to the [Administrative Procedure
Act], [could] be amended by a guidance document that is not so
enacted.”298 The court, affirming the CIT, held that it could not.299
By statute, the DOC is required upon request to review a previously
issued antidumping (“AD”) order, and then must conduct such a
review at least once a year at prescribed times.300 The statute, however,

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1386.
880 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1336–37.
Id. at 1337 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2012)).
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does not tell the DOC how it should treat requests for review that are
withdrawn.301 To bridge this gap, the DOC adopted a regulation,
which, inter alia, instructs the DOC Secretary to “rescind an
administrative review . . . , in whole or in part, if a party that requested
a review withdraws the request within [ninety] days of the date of
publication of notice of initiation of the requested review.”302 The
regulation further allows filing an extension “if the Secretary decides
that it is reasonable to do so.”303 The history of this provision, set forth
in detail in the opinion, reflects the DOC’s understanding of
reasonable grounds to extend a deadline for filing a withdrawal, such
as to prevent waste of departmental resources, to allow parties time to
learn the results of prior administrative reviews, and to avoid
conducting undesired reviews.304
In August 2011, the DOC issued a “Notice” that dramatically
changed how the DOC approached requests for extensions of time to
file withdrawals. The Notice stated, inter alia, that:
In order to provide parties additional certainty with respect to when
the Department will exercise its discretion to extend this [ninety]day deadline, interested parties are advised that, with regard to
reviews requested on the basis of anniversary months on or after
August 2011, the Department will not consider extending the
[ninety]-day deadline unless the requestor demonstrates that an
extraordinary circumstance has prevented it from submitting a
timely withdrawal request. Determinations by the Department to
extend the [ninety]-day deadline will be made on a case-by-case basis.305

In 2012, two producers of glycine—one from China (Baoding
Mantong Fine Chemistry Co., Ltd. (“Baoding”)) and the other from the
United States (GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (“GEO Specialty”))—
asked the DOC to review a 1995 AD order on glycine imported from
China.306 GEO Specialty withdrew its request on the last day of the
applicable ninety-day period, but Baoding made its withdrawal request
after the deadline had expired.307 Baoding argued that extraordinary
circumstances existed, offering that its withdrawal would have had no
effect prior to GEO Specialty’s withdrawal, and that Baoding did not

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id. (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) (2018)).
Id. (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1)).
Id. at 1338–40.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1336–37, 1340–41.
Id. at 1341.
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learn of GEO Specialty’s actions until after the ninety-day period had
expired.308 In addition, Baoding suggested that granting its withdrawal
would preserve DOC resources, as Baoding had not yet submitted its
questionnaire responses.309 The DOC Secretary declined to grant the
extension.310 Glycine & More, a U.S. importer of Baoding’s glycine,
objected to the DOC’s rejection of Baoding’s request to withdraw as
well as to the dumping duty margin assigned to Baoding, which
ultimately led Glycine & More to file suit in the CIT.311
The CIT determined that the DOC’s interpretation of the 2011
Notice was unreasonable, and that the DOC’s rejection of Baoding’s
withdrawal request was improper.312 Accordingly, the CIT remanded
the matter to the DOC.313 In doing so, the CIT told the DOC to
consider that “[Baoding’s] request occurred only days after the
[ninety]-day deadline expired; that the review was in an early stage with
no questionnaire response being submitted; that [Baoding] could not
have known the final results of the prior review; and that all parties
who had requested the review wanted it rescinded.”314 The CIT made
clear its opinion that unless the DOC identified “new and compelling
circumstance[s],” it “appears likely” that an extension of the ninety-day
period should be allowed.315 On remand, the DOC granted the
requested extension under protest, as it could not find any “new and
compelling circumstance[s]” to justify a second denial.316 The CIT
affirmed the DOC’s extension.317 GEO Specialty appealed.318
The Federal Circuit held that, because the regulation was
unambiguous (which is the first inquiry that must be made), no
deference to the DOC’s interpretation of the rule was warranted.319
The court concluded that:

308. Id.
309. See id. (finding that Baoding had failed to show extraordinary circumstances
sufficient for the DOC to grant an extension).
310. Id. at 1337, 1342.
311. Id. at 1342.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1342–43.
314. Id. at 1343.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1344.
319. Id. at 1344–45.
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[T]he meaning of the 2011 Notice is plain, and the difference
between what the sentence at issue meant before and after the
Notice is equally plain. Before the Notice, the regulation was
understood to provide the Secretary with wide discretion, to use
judgment regarding the facts and circumstances presented, and to
apply a reasonableness test in making the decision whether to
extend the deadline for filing a withdrawal notice. After the 2011
Notice, only “extraordinary circumstances” would do, and the
Secretary’s discretion was to be applied narrowly to the case, and
only when an applicant for extension could prove such
extraordinary circumstances exist. Thus, the Notice represented an
incompatible departure from the clear meaning of the regulation.
It was not simply an interpretive statement regarding an ambiguity
in the regulation or a general statement of policy.320

The court explained further that to give deference to the DOC’s
position “would be to permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation” without
going through the appropriate process.321 “Since the 2011 Notice was
intended to effectively rewrite the substantive meaning of the
regulation without going through the necessary notice-and-comment
rulemaking,” the court held the Notice “has no legal standing, and
thus provides no basis upon which the Secretary could make his
decision. That was the ruling made by the CIT, and it is correct.”322
E. ThyssenKrupp Steel North America, Inc. v. United States
In ThyssenKrupp Steel North America, Inc. v. United States,323 the Federal
Circuit addressed CBP’s refusal to apply DOC liquidation instructions
to ThyssenKrupp’s entries of corrosion-resistant (“CORE”) steel.324
The court determined that the CIT had subject matter jurisdiction
over the case, and that application of the DOC instructions was a nonministerial task requiring the implementation of new law.325
Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
for further proceedings.326

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 1345.
Id. (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
Id.
886 F.3d 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1220–21.
Id. at 1220–21, 1225.
Id. at 1228.
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In 1993, the DOC issued an AD order on imports of CORE from
Germany.327 In March 2013, the DOC revoked this order, retroactively
effective to February 14, 2012.328 The DOC issued instructions to CBP
in April 2013 (“April Instructions”) regarding this revocation,
providing, inter alia, that:
[CBP] is directed to terminate the suspension of liquidation for all
shipments of CORE from Germany which were entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after
02/14/2012. All entries of CORE from Germany that were
suspended on or after 02/14/2012 should be liquidated without
regard to antidumping duties (i.e., release all bonds and refund all
cash deposits with interest). . .
Liquidation instructions covering certain entries of CORE from
Germany during the period 08/01/2011 through 07/31/2012 were
issued under message number 2291302, dated 10/17/2012.
However, as noted [sic] paragraph 1 above, this order has been
revoked, effective 02/14/2012. Accordingly, all unliquidated entries
of CORE from Germany entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption on or after 02/14/2012 should be liquidated without
regard to antidumping duties.329

After the February 14, 2012, revocation effective date, but before the
DOC announced the revocation in March 2013, ThyssenKrupp
imported several entries of CORE from Germany.330 The DOC
announced its liquidation calculation for six of these entries on
November 16, 2012, and on December 21, 2012, for the remaining
two.331 After the DOC published the revocation notice of the 1993 AD
order, ThyssenKrupp protested these liquidations, arguing that each
was subject to the April Instructions that eliminated the AD duties on
those entries.332 The Port of Philadelphia denied ThyssenKrupp’s
protest, maintaining that the revocation notice applied only to
“unliquidated entries.”333 The Port of Mobile took a very different
position, referring the protest to CBP headquarters “because that Port
believed that ThyssenKrupp’s ‘arguments regarding liquidation
finality raise questions of interpretive application’”—that is, the protest

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1219–20 (alterations in original).
Id. at 1218–19.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1220.
Id.
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required more than a “ministerial reaction.”334 Ultimately, CBP
determined that the April Instructions unambiguously applied only to
unliquidated entries and, because each of ThyssenKrupp’s entries
were liquidated before the April Instructions issued, ThyssenKrupp
was still subject to the AD duties.335 CBP also stated that its “refusal to
reliquidate [ThyssenKrupp’s] entries pursuant to the [April 4]
revocation instructions is not protestable” because that refusal was a
merely ministerial act.336 ThyssenKrupp filed suit in the CIT.337
The CIT granted the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) and its motion for judgment on
the pleadings under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i).338 The CIT determined that:
(1) ThyssenKrupp’s protest was not timely filed; (2) CBP’s disposition
of the protest did not constitute a “denial” of a protest under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a); and (3) the liquidations in November and December 2012
were not “decisions of the [CBP],” but rather were purely ministerial.339
ThyssenKrupp appealed.340
In its opinion, the Federal Circuit dealt with each of the CIT’s
determinations in turn. First, the court held that ThyssenKrupp’s
protest had been timely filed during the 180-day window prescribed in
19 U.S.C. § 1514—a fact acknowledged by CBP.341 ThyssenKrupp
submitted its protests in April and May 2013 in response to CBP actions
that took place in November and December 2012.342
Second, the panel held that CBP’s actions regarding ThyssenKrupp’s
protests qualified as denials pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), as CBP
used a form to respond to ThyssenKrupp’s protests, deeming them
“non-protestable.”343 The government did not argue to the contrary.344
Third, the court held that ThyssenKrupp’s claims did not pertain to
purely ministerial acts of CBP, but rather required CBP to apply new
law to ThyssenKrupp’s entries.345 Indeed, the panel drew attention to
the six-page opinion letter CBP issued interpreting the April
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1222–23.
Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1223–25.
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Instructions, which invoked statutory language, regulations, and case
law.346 CBP had defined “unliquidated,” applied that interpretation to
ThyssenKrupp’s protests, and then left standing the liquidation
decisions.347 Thus, the court concluded, CBP “made a determination
that embodied meaningful judgments about what was required,” which
was “hardly a ministerial act.”348
After holding that “unliquidated” was ambiguous, the Federal
Circuit went on to reject CBP’s interpretation thereof in favor of a
definition that included “entries covered by liquidation
determinations that are still subject to alteration through ordinary
direct review mechanisms.”349 This definition, according to the court,
takes into account regulations reflecting that “liquidation” often is not
final.350 In sum, the Federal Circuit stated that:
The government cites nothing in the statute or legislative history
that supports its view that the revoked antidumping duties continue
to apply to entries that occurred after the revocation date, just
because there was an initial liquidation determination as to those
entries, even when that determination is subject to a timely filed
protest. Nor does the government’s view make sense in terms of the
basic policy: [the DOC] has determined that entries made on or
after the revocation date do not [warrant] antidumping duties, yet
the government’s view would apply such duties to those entries.351

The court concluded that because the April Instructions “do not
plainly exclude ThyssenKrupp’s entries, [CBP’s] interpretation and
application of the term ‘unliquidated’ are reviewable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a).”352 In light of this conclusion, the court did not address
ThyssenKrup’s alternative arguments that subject matter jurisdiction
existed under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i), or that the April Instructions were
contrary to law.353

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1227–28.
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F. Bell Supply Co. v. United States
In Bell Supply Co. v. United States,354 the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded a CIT determination that Chinese oil country tubular goods
(“OCTG”), the processing for which is finished in third countries, did
not circumvent AD/CVD orders directed to such goods from China.355
OCTG are steel pipes and tubes used in conjunction with oil and gas
wells.356 They are produced by first making a “green tube,” which is a
steel tube that must undergo some type of “finishing” (e.g., heat
treatment, threading, coating, etc.) before it can be used in its
intended applications.357 In 2010, the DOC issued AD/CVD orders on
OCTG from China that included both finished and unfinished tubes,
including green tubes.358
Subsequently, CBP determined that unfinished OCTG from China
that is finished in a third country before being imported into the
United States was considered to have a country of origin of that third
country.359 Specifically, the DOC indicated that “heat treating has been
held to substantially transform green tubes into oil well tubing.”360 This
determination prompted requests for clarification of the orders by
multiple domestic steel companies.361 In 2014, in response to those
requests, the DOC issued a final scope ruling that took a position
opposite to that of CBP by treating Chinese OCTG finished in third
countries as still being subject to the orders.362 The DOC made clear
“that green tubes are not substantially transformed during the
finishing process, even if that process includes heat treatment.”363 Bell
Supply, a U.S. steel importer that purchased green tubes from China
and then had them heat treated and finished in Indonesia, contested
the DOC’s scope ruling.364
The CIT determined that the DOC’s interpretation was not
supported by the words of the orders, and that the substantial
transformation test should not have been used to analyze whether

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

888 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1224–25.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1225–26.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id.
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OCTG imported from Indonesia fell within the ambit of the orders.365
Rather, if the DOC believed the orders were being circumvented, the CIT
instructed that 19 U.S.C. § 1677j was designed for this specific inquiry and
thus must be employed.366 Accordingly, the CIT remanded the matter.367
On remand, the DOC, again, concluded that green tubes from
China were covered by the orders, even if they were finished in a third
country, but, this time, the DOC did not rely on the substantial
transformation test.368 Instead, the DOC reasoned that “the plain
language of the scope of the Orders expressly covers unfinished Chinese
OCTG, and that language can reasonably be interpreted to include
unfinished OCTG [from China], even when finished in a third country.”369
The CIT rejected the DOC’s reasoning, stating that the orders contained
no specific language about third country processing, and that such silence
could not be interpreted as support for the DOC outcome.370
In its third consideration of the case, the DOC, relying on factors
contained in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k), ruled that OCTG from China,
which is finished in third countries, did not fall within the scope of the
orders.371 The DOC also ruled that OCTG imported from Indonesia
did not satisfy the circumvention standards within 19 U.S.C. § 1677j, as
the activities conducted in Indonesia are not “minor [or]
insignificant,” but rather “add[] significant value to the final value of
the finished OCTG.”372 The CIT sustained this last round of DOC
rulings, and the domestic steel companies appealed.373
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first dealt with the question of
whether the products at issue could be considered unfinished OCTG
from China. The court held they could not, as the OCTG
“unquestionably” arrives in the United States as a finished product.374
The domestic steel companies claimed that “the merchandise can still
be categorized as unfinished OCTG because that is how it left China,
and the Orders do not require the unfinished OCTG to be ‘directly

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id.
Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k) (2018)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227–28.
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imported.’”375 The court, however pointed to precedent teaching that
the mere absence of a direct importation requirement in the orders
does not expand their scope.376 The DOC “cannot find authority in an
order based on the theory that the order does not deny authority.”377
The Federal Circuit next dealt with the question of whether the
products at issue could be considered finished OCTG from China.378
The parties disagreed over the test to employ in making this
assessment. The domestic steel companies maintained a substantial
transformation analysis is appropriate to determine the legal country
of origin of imported merchandise.379 “A substantial transformation
occurs where, ‘as a result of manufacturing or processing steps . . . [,]
the [product] loses its identity and is transformed into a new product
having a new name, character and use.’”380 Bell Supply contended the
circumvention test under 19 U.S.C. § 1677j should be used.381 This
provision is intended to stop importers from avoiding a duty order by
routing products through a third country not subject to the order
where only “minor or insignificant” processing occurs.382
The Federal Circuit held that the DOC “is entitled to use the
substantial transformation analysis to determine country of origin
before resorting to the circumvention inquiry.”383 The court reasoned
that, to evaluate whether a duty order is being circumvented, it must
begin by determining where an imported article is legally from, which
can be ambiguous given that a single product can be manufactured
from various components from various countries and require multiple
processing steps.384 If the application of the substantial transformation
test shows that a product has a country of origin that is identified in
the duty order at issue, then no further inquiry is needed.385 If,
however, the substantial transformation test shows that a product has
a country of origin that is not identified in the duty order at issue, that
product can only fall within the ambit of the order if circumvention is

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id. at 1228.
Id.
Id. (quoting Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Bestfoods v. United States, 165 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 1228–29.
Id. at 1229 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(1)(C) (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1230.
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found under 19 U.S.C. § 1677j.386 This order of application does not
render § 1677j superfluous, as the CIT contended. Even if a product
is transformed into something new, the court noted, the process for
such transformation still may be insignficant and carried out in an
attempt to sidestep a duty order.387 The Federal Circuit also pointed
to the provision’s legislative history in support of this interpretation, as
it “indicates that § 1677j can capture merchandise that is substantially
transformed in third countries.”388 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the CIT to determine whether the DOC had
done a proper substantial transformation analysis.389
G. Meridian Products, LLC v. United States
Meridian Products, LLC v. United States390 is another decision
addressing AD/CVD orders for aluminum extrusions from China. In
this matter, as it did in Whirlpool Corp. v. United States391 (discussed
below), the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s determination that
aluminum kitchen appliance door handles were outside the scope of
those orders.392 The orders encompassed “parts for final finished
products that are assembled after importation.”393 Included were
“aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., by welding
or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled
merchandise.”394 There were two exclusions to this scope: one for
finished merchandise and one for finished goods kits.395 “A finished
goods kit is understood to mean a packaged combination of parts that
contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully
assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or
fabrication . . . .”396 A product could not be excluded as a finished
goods kit “merely by including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in
the packaging with an aluminum extrusion product.”397
386. Id. at 1230.
387. Id. at 1230–31.
388. Id. at 1231.
389. Id.
390. 890 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
391. 890 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
392. Meridian, 890 F.3d at 1274. For a discussion of Whirlpool, see infra Section IV.H.
393. Meridian, 890 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s
Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (May 26, 2011)).
394. Id. (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650–51).
395. Id. at 1274–75.
396. Id. at 1275 (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651).
397. Id. (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651).

1470

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1425

In January 2013, Meridian requested a scope ruling from the DOC
on whether its merchandise was subject to the orders, and, a few
months later, the DOC determined that it was.398 The inclusion of
plastic end caps, according to the DOC, did not provide a basis to rely
on the finished goods kit exclusion, as they were “fasteners” for
purposes of the scope ruling.399 The DOC explained that the language
in the orders supported this conclusion (i.e., that “fasteners” include
items “such as screws, bolts, etc.”), as did Meridian’s description of its
own products (i.e., “[t]he end caps are used to fasten the handle to the
door”).400 As such, the finished goods kit exclusion did not apply
because the orders made clear that the inclusion of such fasteners in
the packaging did not render the product a finished goods kit.401
Moreover, the DOC found that Meridian’s merchandise was covered by
the orders because their “scope expressly includes aluminum extrusions
which are identified by reference to their end use,” such as, oven door
handles.402 Thus, “the handles are included with[in] the scope regardless
of whether or not they are ready for use ‘as is’ before importation.”403
Meridian challenged the DOC’s ruling, and the CIT reversed.404 The
CIT determined that the plastic end caps were not fasteners, but rather
“components of a complete handle assembly.”405 Further, the CIT
determined that Meridian’s products qualified under the finished
merchandise exclusion because the oven door handles were ready for
use “as is” in their imported state.406 The CIT remanded the case to the
DOC, which, under protest, redetermined that the oven door handles were
not within the scope of the orders.407 The CIT affirmed, and the Aluminum
Extrusions Fair Trade Committee appealed to the Federal Circuit.408
The Federal Circuit held that the DOC had demonstrated by
substantial evidence that the oven door handles “alone consist of
extruded aluminum products that meet the physical descriptions of
merchandise subject to the order,” and that they did not satisfy the
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1278–79.
400. Id. at 1279.
401. Id. at 1275.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1280.
404. Id. at 1276.
405. Id. (quoting Meridian Prods., LLC v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1314
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2015)).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1277.
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finished goods kit exclusion.409 In reversing the CIT’s determination,
the court stated that the CIT had “improperly narrowed the scope of
the antidumping duty order by finding that the [oven door] handles
are ‘assemblies’ that are not covered by the general scope
description.”410 As it was unclear whether Meridian’s handles were
“fully and permanently assembled at the time of entry,” the court
remanded the matter for clarification.411 If the handles are found to be
imported unassembled, then the DOC’s original scope ruling controls,
and the matter ends.412 If the handles are found to be imported “fully
and permanently assembled,” then a determination must be made as to
whether the finished merchandise exclusion is applicable.413
H. Whirlpool Corp. v. United States
Like Meridian, which issued just one day prior, Whirlpool is another
appeal involving AD/CVD orders issued in 2011 for aluminum extrusions
imported from China.414 As outlined above, extrusions subject to the
orders were “parts for final finished products that are assembled after
importation,” or parts “that are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to
form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise.”415 There are
two exclusions to the general scope of the orders: (1) a finished
merchandise exclusion, covering products “containing aluminum
extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and
completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors
with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and backing material,
and solar panels”;416 and (2) a finished goods kit exclusion that is “a
packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation,
all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and
requires no further finishing or fabrication.”417
In December 2013, Whirlpool requested a scope ruling that its
kitchen appliance door handles with end caps were not covered by the

409. Id. at 1278, 1281.
410. Id. at 1280.
411. Id. at 1281–82.
412. Id. at 1282.
413. Id.
414. Whirlpool Corp. v. United States, 890 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see
Meridian, 890 F.3d at 1274.
415. Whirlpool, 890 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s
Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (May 26, 2011)).
416. Id. at 1305–06 (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651).
417. Id. at 1306.
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orders.418 The DOC determined in August 2014 that Whirlpool’s
handles did not satisfy the exclusion criteria for finished merchandise
and, thus, were subject to the orders.419 In doing so, the DOC also found
that the fasteners exception applied to both the finished goods kit
exclusion as well as to the finished merchandise exclusion.420 Accordingly,
the DOC stated that “the mere inclusion of fasteners, in this case the plastic
end caps, does not result in the extruded aluminum handles falling outside
the scope of the Orders as extruded finished merchandise.”421
Whirlpool filed suit in the CIT, which remanded the matter on two
bases. First, the CIT held that the general scope language of the orders
could not be read to include Whirlpool’s handles.422 Second, the CIT
held that the DOC “erroneously determined that the assembled
handles do not qualify for the finished merchandise exclusion because
the fasteners exception does not apply to the finished merchandise
exclusion.”423 On remand, the DOC redetermined, under protest, that
Whirlpool’s products were outside the scope of the orders, and the CIT
affirmed that second DOC ruling.424 In August 2016, the Aluminum
Extrusions Fair Trade Committee, the same appellant as in Meridian,
appealed to the Federal Circuit.425
The Federal Circuit first held that Whirlpool’s assembled handles were
covered by the general scope language of the orders.426 Contrary to the
CIT’s finding, the court observed the orders’ “general scope language
unambiguously includes aluminum extrusions that are part of an assembly”
as they “explicitly include aluminum extrusions ‘that are assembled after
importation’ in addition to ‘aluminum extrusion components that are
attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies.’”427
The Federal Circuit next ruled on the applicability of the exclusions
and exceptions to Whirlpool’s products. Agreeing with the CIT, the
court held that the finished goods kit exclusion did not apply because
Whirlpool’s handles were not imported in disassembled form.428
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 1307.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1305, 1307; see Meridian Prods., LLC v. United States, 890 F.3d 1272, 1274
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
426. Whirlpool, 890 F.3d at 1308–09.
427. Id. at 1309.
428. Id.
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The court also agreed with the CIT that the exception for fasteners
unambiguously pertained only to the finished goods kit exclusion, but
not the finished merchandise exclusion.429 The sole sentence
referencing the fastener exception mentions finished goods kits, but
not finished merchandise.430 Further, that same single sentence
references “packaging,” invoking the definition of the finished goods
kit exclusion (i.e., “a packaged combination of parts”).431 Such
language has nothing to do with finished merchandise, which is “fully
and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry.”432
Further still, the court opined that if the DOC “had actually intended
to sweep into the scope all finished merchandise consisting solely of
aluminum extrusion components and fasteners, it would have done so
in the scope language rather than expressly confining its fasteners
exception to the finished goods kit exclusion.”433
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the CIT to determine
whether Whirlpool’s handles met the requirements for the finished
merchandise exclusion.434 Judge Reyna dissented on this procedural
course of action, however, as he considered that question to have been
answered.435 He noted “[t]he Orders define ‘finished merchandise’ as
merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully
and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such
as finished windows with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane
and backing material, and solar panels.”436 The DOC, as Judge Reyna
highlighted, already had found Whirlpool’s products to have been
covered by the orders because, inter alia, “there are no components or
parts included, whether loose or attached.”437 The DOC also already
had “determined that if a product that only consists of aluminum
extrusions and fasteners, as in this case, satisfies the finished
merchandise exclusion, the exclusion would swallow the scope
‘because any aluminum extrusion products, as long as it can be

429. Id. at 1310.
430. Id.
431. Id. (quoting Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China:
Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30651 (May 26, 2011)).
432. Id. (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651).
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1311–12.
435. Id. at 1312–13 (Reyna, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
436. Id. at 1313 n.2.
437. Id. at 1312–13.
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identified by end use, could be considered a finished product.’”438
Thus, the DOC “reasoned that this cannot be the correct interpretation
because it is contrary to the scope itself, which covers aluminum
extrusions.”439 Accordingly, Judge Reyna would have affirmed the
DOC’s determination that Whirlpool’s handles did not fall within the
finished merchandise exclusion.440
I. Sunpreme Inc. v. United States
In Sunpreme Inc. v. United States,441 the Federal Circuit held that the
CIT lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and, therefore,
reversed the CIT’s determination.442 Sunpreme is a U.S. company that
imported from a Chinese entity solar modules composed of “several
layers of amorphous silicon less than one micron in thickness.”443 A
dispute arose regarding whether Sunpreme’s products were subject to
the AD/CVD orders issued in 2012 covering CSPV cells from China.444
Those orders explicitly excluded from their scope “thin film photovoltaic
products produced from amorphous silicon.”445 Ultimately, this dispute
prompted Sunpreme to request a scope ruling from the DOC, which
was initiated on December 30, 2015.446
Twenty-two days beforehand, however, on December 8, 2015,
Sunpreme filed suit in the CIT, challenging CBP’s collection of cash
deposits and suspension of liquidation, as well as seeking a preliminary
injunction to prevent further collections.447 Sunpreme claimed CBP
“acted ultra vires and exceeded its ministerial task of collecting
antidumping and countervailing duties by interpreting the CSPV
Orders to cover Sunpreme’s solar modules, despite that thin film
products were expressly excluded from the coverage” thereof.448 The
government moved to dismiss Sunpreme’s complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Sunpreme had failed to
438. Id. at 1313.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. 892 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
442. Id. at 1188.
443. Id. at 1189.
444. Id. at 1190.
445. Id. at 1189 (quoting Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not
Assembled Into Modules, From the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty
Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,017, 73,017 (Dec. 7, 2012)).
446. Id. at 1190.
447. Id.
448. Id.
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exhaust its administrative remedies by preemptively filing a complaint
with the CIT without first obtaining a scope ruling from the DOC.449
The CIT granted Sunpreme’s preliminary injunction, denied the
government’s motion to dismiss (determining that jurisdiction existed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)), and ordered CBP to return already paid
duties to Sunpreme (that were the fruit of CBP’s ultra vires acts).450
The Federal Circuit, in addressing the government’s appeal from
the CIT’s decision, focused on the singular issue of jurisdiction.451 The
CIT had relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) to support its jurisdiction over
Sunpreme’s complaint.452 This provision, according to the court,
“embodies a ‘residual’ grant of jurisdiction, and may not be invoked
when jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could have
been available, unless the remedy provided under that other
subsection would be manifestly inadequate.”453 The Federal Circuit
held that the CIT did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)
because jurisdiction was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which
governs challenges at the CIT to DOC scope rulings.454
Moreover, the court held that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) was
not “manifestly inadequate.”455 The fact that Sunpreme might suffer
severe financial hardship did not alter this result, as “mere allegations
of financial harm do not render a remedy established by Congress
manifestly inadequate.”456 Rather, to be “manifestly inadequate,” a
remedy must be, for example, “an exercise in futility,” or “useless.”457
Delay also is insufficient to demonstrate that a remedy is “manifestly
inadequate.”458 The court concluded that Sunpreme had made no
such showing with regard to the relief offered by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).459
In addition, the court held that “Sunpreme was required to exhaust
the administrative remedies available to it in the form of a scope ruling
449. Id. at 1191.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
454. Id. at 1191–92 (“[W]hen relief is prospectively and realistically available under
another subsection of 1581, invocation of subsection (i) is incorrect.”) (alteration in
original) (quoting Chemsol, LLC v. United States, 755 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014))).
455. Id. at 1192.
456. Id. at 1193 (citing Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
457. Id. at 1193–94 (citations omitted).
458. Id. at 1194.
459. Id.
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inquiry and scope ruling determination.”460 “The problem Sunpreme
c[ould not] overcome is that it failed to wait until it had a formal scope
ruling in hand prior to filing suit.”461 Such a requirement is
appropriate, the court explained, because “[p]ermitting such
circumventions would discourage importers from seeking scope
rulings and undermine the remedial scheme establish by Congress.”462
Sunpreme’s attempt to sidestep this procedural problem through
“creative pleading” was unavailing.463 Although Sunpreme had cast its
complaint as one addressing CBP’s ultra vires acts, the panel
recognized the relief Sunpreme sought as being properly afforded by
a scope ruling from the DOC and, thus, subject to the CIT’s
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).464
J. SolarWorld Americas, Inc. v. United States
In yet another opinion involving duty orders covering CSPV cells
from China, the Federal Circuit in SolarWorld Americas, Inc. v. United
States465 affirmed the CIT’s determination as to the correct AD margin
calculation related thereto.466 The AD order in question issued in
December 2012, and, pursuant to a timely request, an administrative
review of the order was initiated.467 The focus of the review was limited
to the two largest Chinese exporters of those products—Wuxi Suntech
Power Co., Ltd. and Yingli Energy (China) Co., Ltd. (“Yingli”).468 In
July 2015, the DOC issued its opinion, which, inter alia, calculated a
weighted-average AD margin for Yingli of 0.79 percent.469 To arrive at
this percentage, the DOC relied in part on a selection of surrogate
values for each of Yingli’s production factors, including aluminum
frames and semi-finished polysilicon ingots and blocks.470 The
460. Id. at 1192.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 1193.
463. Id.
464. See id.
465. 910 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
466. Id. at 1220.
467. Id. at 1221.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. As the court explained:
[I]f [the DOC] determines the exporting country is a “nonmarket economy
country” and “finds that available information does not permit the normal
value of the subject merchandise to be determined under [§ 1677b(a)],” then
[the DOC] calculates normal value by valuing the “factors of production” used
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calculation for aluminum frames used a value from the Thai
Harmonized Tariff Schedule heading 7604 for “[a]luminum bars,
rods[,] and profiles” under subheading 7604.29 that included such
products other than those already specified in subheadings at a
comparable level, including “non-hollow profiles.”471 The calculation
for semi-finished polysilicon ingots and blocks used a value from the
world market price for polysilicon.472 SolarWorld, a domestic producer
of the products at issue, brought suit in the CIT, claiming that the DOC
undervalued the surrogate values for Yingli’s inputs and, consequently,
calculated an improperly low AD duty margin for Yingli.473
The CIT disagreed. It determined that the surrogate value the DOC
chose for aluminum frames was more specific than Thai HTS
subheading 7616.99 covering, inter alia, “articles of aluminum [not
elsewhere specific or included],” for which SolarWorld advocated.474
The CIT also determined that the surrogate value the DOC chose for
semi-finished polysilicon ingots and blocks was “the best available
information on the record for that factor of production, in part because
it was the only surrogate value of record.”475 SolarWorld appealed.476
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination.477 With
regard to the surrogate value for aluminum frames, the court found
in producing the merchandise in comparable “market economy country or
countries.” Specifically, [the DOC] must value the factors of production “to
the extent possible . . . in one or more market economy countries that are—
(A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket
economy country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.”
Accordingly, in selecting these so-called surrogate values to represent the
factors of production, [the DOC] “attempts to construct a hypothetical market
value of that product in the nonmarket economy.”
Id. at 1220–21 (third and sixth alternations in original) (citations omitted). A
“nonmarket economy country” is defined as “any foreign country that [the DOC]
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that
sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”
Id. at 1220 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2012)).
China is categorized as a nonmarket economy country, and, thus, the DOC, typically
does not deem credible sales in China and financial data received from Chinese
producers for calculating the normal value of subject merchandise under § 1677b(a).
Id.
471. Id. at 1222–23 (alterations in original).
472. Id. at 1221.
473. See id.
474. Id. at 1221–22 (alteration in original).
475. Id. at 1222.
476. Id. at 1219–20.
477. Id. at 1220.
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that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports [the DOC’s] finding that import
data under Thai HTS [h]eading 7604 constitutes the best available
information from which to value Yingli’s aluminum frames.”478 Yingli,
in its questionnaire, described its products as “‘alloyed aluminum
profiles’ that are ‘not hollow,’” which tracks the language in the Thai HTS
subheading the DOC chose.479 Any potential discordance between the
ENs for heading 7604 (describing a uniform cross-section) and
SolarWorld’s contention that some of the Yingli products at issue
contain corners (meaning that some of those products do not have
uniform cross-sections) is unavailing.480 The court concluded that
Thai HTS heading 7604 still constituted the best available information,
given the similarities identified by the DOC. “[The DOC] is ‘not
required to engage in a classification analysis’ but instead is ‘required
to determine which of the competing subheadings constituted the best
available information.’”481 Indeed, the DOC is imbued by statute with
broad discretion in choosing the best available information to use for
valuing factors of production.482 Although CBP classification rulings
can be considered in calculating surrogate value choices, “[the DOC]
is not bound by [CBP] rulings on imports for purposes of a best
available information determination.”483
With regard to the surrogate value for semi-finished polysilicon
ingots and blocks, the Federal Circuit also found that substantial
evidence existed to support the DOC’s selection of a surrogate value.484
The world market price that the DOC used came from two different
data sources, it accounted for processing costs Yingli was expected to
have, and no other surrogate value could be identified.485 The DOC
was not required to construct a surrogate value from scratch for these
goods, and it is not the practice of the DOC to do so.486

478. Id. at 1223.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id. (quoting Downhole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United States, 776 F.3d 1369,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
482. Id. at 1224.
483. Id. at 1225.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1225–26.
486. Id. at 1226.
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CONCLUSION
Trade has been of perennial importance to the development of the
American economic and legal systems. As the CIT recounted, “[t]he
first case tried before the first judge appointed to the first court
organized under the Constitution of the United States involved a
dispute arising from an importation into the new nation.”487 With over
$2 trillion dollars of imports coming into the country annually, the
delivery of predictable, measured, and fair redress for the myriad
disputes that come with this level of activity is as challenging as it is
critical.488 Each decision in the Federal Circuit’s 2018 international
trade jurisprudence, from the most granular (i.e., classifying varieties of
screws)489 to the most sweeping (i.e., defining the limits of Presidential
power to implement tariffs),490 reflects the same deliberate, thoughtful
expertise that further strengthens the U.S. trade enforcement regime.

487. About the Court, U.S. COURT OF INT’L TRADE, https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/
about-court (last visited May 20, 2019).
488. United States Imports, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOLUTION, https://wits.world
bank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/USA/StartYear/2013/EndYear/2017/Trade
Flow/Import/indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL (last visited May 20, 2019).
489. See supra Section III.C (reviewing GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States, 885 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
490. See supra Section II.A (reviewing Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).

